Rethinking Trust, Crime Policy and Social Theory

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Abstract

This article analyses the relationship of ‘trust’ to crime, power and criminal justice policy. The theoretical model employed to analyse this relationship draws from Owen’s (2009a), conceptually driven argument that is based on an ontologically-flexible critique of agency-structure, micro-macro and time-space. This relationship stands at the interface of competing pressures working to produce the increasing complexity of crime and criminal justice policy (Powell 2005). We then move the attention to the conceptual problems of ‘trust’ which is linked with uncertainty and complexity whilst law and order and crime policies rest on the specialist knowledge claimed by a range of professional “experts” and technologists that inhabit powerful spaces through which crime policy and practice is governed and articulated.

Introduction

This paper sets out to explore the relationship of ‘trust’ to crime, power and criminal justice policy in the United Kingdom. In doing so, our approach to ‘trust’ is informed by Owen’s (2009a) Post-Postmodern, ontologically-flexible critique of agency-structure, micro-macro and time-space, developed further beyond Roger Sibeon’s original (2004) work. It is the contention here that the relationship between policy and delivery does have an impact on individual identity and agency at a number of levels in everyday life: intrapersonal, personal, interpersonal, systems or organisational levels and the socio-political. This relationship stands at the interface of competing pressures working to produce the increasing complexity of social life (Powell 2005). ‘Trust’ is linked with uncertainty and complexity while professional authority rests on the specialist knowledge claimed by the range of experts and technologists that inhabit the criminalized spaces through which social life is governed and articulated (Owen 2009). These spaces: at once both hidden and visible, provide opportunities across the social landscape for the agency of offenders to be exercised and worked on; producing the self-managing citizen central to neo-liberal forms of government.

In this context the strategies of trust become linked with rival crime control programmes that come armed with a range of technologies charged with competing and contested truth claims. As a consequence contradictory positions are provided where selfish desire and selfless obligation are placed together sharing the same space, thus adding to the potential for anxiety and provoking searches for predictability, confidence, faith and ontological security (Sibeon 2004).

It is in these spaces that expertise works upon the dual project of managing both its conduct and the conduct of others, though not in a reified sense. A reflexive process where the expertise is involved in maintaining systems that do not require personal knowledge of any other individual in the system but which do require an overall level of confidence in order to function. In managing systems expertise ‘engages’ techniques of impression management, deploying a range of systems of mistrust designed to both reassure the population of

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the integrity of the system and the authority of the expertise embedded there. At the same time this expertise claims the right to accredit and provide the necessary symbols of authority.

What is Trust?

There have been limited attempts to conceptualize the notion of ‘trust’ in criminological theory as a pivotal dimension of modernity (Giddens, 1991). However, the early statement that ‘social science research on trust has produced a good deal of conceptual confusion regarding the meaning of trust and its place in social life’ (Lewis and Weigert 1985 quoted in Powell, 2005, 55) seems to be still valid especially as applied to criminology. Trust is on the one hand incompatible with complete ignorance of the possibility and probability of future events, and on the other hand with emphatic belief when the anticipation of disappointment is excluded. Someone who trusts has an expectation directed to an event. The expectations are based on the ground of incomplete knowledge about the probability and incomplete control about the occurrence of the event. Trust is of relevance for action and has consequences for the trusting agent if trust is confirmed or disappointed. This is despite Fukuyama’s (1996: 153) cogent claim that, ‘As a general rule, trust arises when a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create expectations of regular honest behaviour’. In other words, Fukuyama is paying testament to the essential role that trust plays in modern life (Walklate, 2007). However, as Walklate (ibid: 154) observes, ‘the kinds of trust that exist’ may not always involve ‘creating regular honest behaviour’ as Fukuyama suggests. For Walklate (ibid), it is just as likely that ‘dishonest’ behaviour is created, and it is the ‘regularity’ of behaviour that ‘sustains or threatens social relationships’. Arguably, these regular social expectations make trust an important issue for future exploration in criminology and victimology. As the author suggests, perhaps Radical Feminist perspectives have served to problematize notions of trust in relation to ‘women’s experiences of criminal victimization’, especially the idea of the home as a ‘safe haven’ and ‘the recognition that the familiar and the familial are not necessarily any more trustworthy than the stranger’ (Walklate, ibid). We concur with Walklate’s observation here, but reject the Radical Feminist concept of ‘Patriarchy’ as a unitary, reductionist source of female oppression. We subscribe instead to Owen’s (2009a) Post-Postmodern, meta-theoretical definition of a social actor as an entity that is in principle capable of formulating and acting upon decisions. Therefore, to regard ‘Patriarchy’ as a social actor would be to engage in illicit reification. Walklate (ibid) again makes some very interesting points about the ‘challenge to universalism posed by postmodernism’ alongside the ‘concomitant effect of greater awareness of the possible future damage of risk-taking activity’ having an influence upon the work of Giddens (1991) and Beck (1992) on trust. Walklate cites Misztal (1996: 239), who believes that ‘By destroying the grounds for believing in a universal truth, postmodernity does not make our lives more easy but only less constrained by rules and more contingent.’. For Misztal (ibid), postmodernity ‘demands new solutions based on the tolerant co-existence of a diversity of cultures’, encouraging us to ‘live without an enemy’. For Walkate (ibid), Misztal’s view ‘in a sense’ endorses the earlier view of Fukuyama. However, following Owen (2009a) we reject the anti-foundational relativism of Postmodern perspectives, favouring instead an ontologically-flexible, meta-theoretical framework which entails methodological generalisations as opposed to substantive generalisations. Arguably, Postmodernists such as Lyotard (1986) reject foundationalism from which theory can be generated, failing to provide an acceptable Postmodern epistemology and a viable Postmodern theory. The most basic criticism of those who hold such relativistic positions such as Lyotard (ibid) and Misztal (ibid) is that they never appear to apply relativism to their own theories and conceptual frameworks. They are open, that is to say, to the self-referential objection’ (Blackledge and Hunt, 1993) which posits that, if all theories are the product of a particular situation, the so too is that theory, and it therefore has no universal validity. To put it another way, if truth and falsity do not exist in an absolute sense, then Lyotard’s thesis about the relativity of all knowledge cannot be ‘true’ in this sense. In arguing the way they do, Postmodernists are surely employing the very criteria of truth and validity which they claim are culturally relative. They are, in a sense, employing reason to try to prove the inadequacy of reason; claiming to provide a universally valid and true explanation of why there is no such thing as a universally valid and true explanation. Put simply, the Postmodern statement that there can be no general theory is itself a general theory.
How does trust actually manifest itself? Walklate and Evans (1999) considered this important question, specifically the ways in which, ‘questions of trust underpin people’s sense of ontological security’ in two high-crime areas, suggesting that they may be understood through the concept of a ‘square of trust’ (Walklate, 2007: 155). Following Nelken (2004), Walklate and Evans (ibid) suggest that in the square of trust, whom one can trust, how one trusts and how much one can trust at the level of the individual depends upon exactly where the individual is located in relation to constituent mechanisms. For example, ‘based on our fieldwork in one community (which we named Oldtown) it would appear that people trust as much as the local neighbourhood dogma permits’ (Walklate, 2007: 155), while seeking to avoid ‘public shaming’ such as being labelled a ‘grass’. As Walklate suggests, this takes the shape of trusting other local people ‘because they are local (mechanisms of sociability)’ (ibid). This does not mean that other individuals are not trusted, but that ‘those others are trusted in a highly individualistic and fragile manner’ and that ‘trust is dependent on what those individuals do with the trust invested in them’ (ibid). This could entail trusting individual police officers, but it does not equate to ‘offering generalized trust to those official agencies (the state)’ (ibid). As Walklate shows, the risks of public shame, ridicule and contempt are too severe to make cooperation with such agencies of the state worthwhile. Such processes do not mean that the community has embraced organized crime, but rather it ‘may have to rethink some of the mechanisms whereby social solidarity is produced and maintained’ (ibid: 155-156). In the other community investigated by Walklate and Evans (Oldtown), (Bankhill), trusting relationships took on a different shape. Older people were still willing to, ‘offer a generalized trust to the ‘official agencies’ (the state) and that there are friendship and community groups that strive to offer some kind of militation against a fully atomized existence (mechanisms of solidarity)’ (Walklate, 2007: 156). However, levels of social disorganization in the community and the expressed fear of crime amongst younger members tended to undermine a ‘sense of belongingness on which the potential for trusting relationships inherent in the call for help from the ‘officials’ might be developed’ (ibid). Thus, the result appeared to be an absence of social solidarity. Walklate makes a powerful point when she says that while trust may well be ‘rooted in history’ it is not historical. Rather, trust is a very real mechanism ‘whereby individuals create a way of managing their routine daily lives, which differently situates them in relation to the state, crime, community, social relationships and protection’. The observed people of Walklate and Evans’ ‘Oldtown’, for example, would not readily call the police for protection, but as a matter of routine, would draw upon organized criminality in their community for protection.

Forms of Trust

Up to now there have been few attempts to work out a systematic scheme of different forms of trust in between older people and individuals, health institutions or policies that impinge on their identity performance. However, as we have seen, there are a few examples of attempts to conceptualise notions of trust in a more general criminological/ sociological sense (Barber, 1983; Fukuyama, 1996 ; Nelken, 1994; Walklate and Evans, 1999; Goldsmith, 2005; Cook, 2006; Owen and Powell, 2006; Hohl et al, 2010; and Jackson et al, forthcoming, 2011). Social trust tends to be high among older people who believe that their public safety is high (Wahidin and Powell, 2009). Since the erosion of public trust in institutions like the government and the media, trust attracts more and more attention in social sciences (Owen and Powell, ibid).

Powell and Wahidin (2009) distinguish between trust in contracts between people and State such as pension provision, trust in friendships across intergenerational lines and trust in love and relationships and trust in foreign issues associated with national identity. However, sociological theories which suppose a general change in modernity (cf. Beck, 1992) assume that with the erosion of traditional institutions and scientific knowledge trust becomes an issue more often produced actively by individuals than institutionally guaranteed.

Independent from the insight that social action in general is dependent more or less on trust there empirical results in the context of risk perception and risk taking indicate:

- Trust is much easier to destroy than to build.
- If trust is once undermined it is more difficult to restore it.
- Familiarity with a place, a situation or a person produces trust.
Persons will develop trust if a person or situation has ascriptive characteristics positively valued.

Trust gives legitimacy to social mores and mores.

Trust seems to be something that is produced individually by experience and over time and cannot be immediately and with purpose be produced by organizations or governments without dialogical interaction with older people on issues affecting their lifestyles and life-chances such as care, pensions, employment and political representation (Powell and Wahidin 2009).

Trust and Law and Order Services

The reciprocal relationship between criminal justice services such as those of the police, courts and prisons and the personal lives of citizens is central to the analysis of the role and performance of law and order services. In a mutually constitutive process, the social experience and identities of individual citizens are produced, in part, through engagement with services which are then affected by the actions of those citizens (Fink 2004, Lewis 2004). The fact that experiences of crime control services impact on different spheres of people’s lives implies that the exploration of trust also has to explore these different domains, but in an integrated multi-disciplinary way that enables comparison between the different criteria upon which trust is established, maintained or lost. Such an approach to trust is aided by the existence of similar concerns across domains. These include: trust as future orientated, trust that occurs without the guarantee of reciprocity, trust that requires the placing of expectations with the agency of others, trust that works to reduce complexity and anxiety, and trust that involves risk and uncertainty. At the same time the observation that mistrust operates as the functional equivalent to trust provides a means of considering the complex interplay between expectations and sanctions (Luhmann 1979).

The decline in the hegemony of the rational choice models of economic and social behaviour, the limits of the post-emotionalism thesis and the apparent weakening of community bonds in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has provoked increasing academic and political interest in the role and function of trust in contemporary societies (Luhmann 1979, Powell and Wahidin 2009). However, trust is a complex idea which can be explored theoretically and empirically on different levels: politically in relation to social capital and social norms; sociologically in relation to abstract systems, complexity and risk; and inter-personally in relation to characteristics of trustworthiness such as competence. Trust can be conceived as generalised, e.g. through the level of trust based exchanges between members of a community; or particular, as in personal relationships. Moreover, there are important definitional problems concerning the relationship between trust, confidence, faith and familiarity (Seligman 1997).

Conceptually there are tensions but also interesting theoretical possibilities between late (high) modern and post-modern conceptions of society. Both identify the fragmentation of traditional forms of authority and expertise, and acknowledge the increasing complexity this produces through the availability of multiple sources of information and different lifestyle choices. This uncertainty gives rise to an increasing reliance on trust in the agency of others (Seligman 1997). Late (high) modern conceptions of trust tend to point to the failure of rational choice theories to account for human behaviour as evidence for the existence of a range of social norms that promote altruistic behaviours, obligation and responsibility (Seligman 1997). Post-structuralists, in particular governmentality theorists, have discussed risk and uncertainty at length (Rose 1999), but leave the discussion of (social) ‘trust’ to an observation that the trust traditionally placed in authority figures has been replaced by audit. Concerns about social norms could be reframed within a post-structuralist lens by locating the debate about trust with those relating to ‘ethics’ and ‘technologies of the self’ (Millar 1993, Davidson 1994). However, despite our recognition of the (limited) usefulness of some postmodern and post-structuralist insights, we reiterate that we reject the extreme relativism associated with these schools of thought as anti-foundational. To recap, we favour instead a metatheoretical approach, such as that employed by Owen (2009a), which entails a flexible, ‘realist’ social ontology, multi-factorial analysis and which may be called Post-Postmodern. Our approach to the concept of trust is informed by Owen’s (ibid) critique of agency-structure, micro-macro, time-space and biology-the social. We favour methodological generalisations as opposed to substantive generalisations in analysis, avoiding essentialism, reductionism, functional teleology and reification.
As stated earlier, trust and responsiveness are assumed to be the issues of central concern with transparency and targets providing supporting technologies through which trust is promoted and maintained. The discussion will now turn to explore the relationship between trust and targets, transparency and responsiveness. For the purpose of this section Luhmann’s (1979) definition of trust as ‘managing expectations and reducing complexity’ is assumed.

In considering the performance of services we need to identify transparency and responsiveness as core values, arguing that a balance of consumerist ‘choice’ and participatory ‘voice’ is essential to the quality and performance of crime control and community safety. For example, responsiveness to the creation of Crime Reduction Strategies (CRS) as enveloped within the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) in the UK becomes a blend of choice and voice at both individual and organisational levels inclusive of police, courts, LEA, schools and parental groups, with the proposition that consumers will participate in the setting of CRS targets and contracts. In the context of crime control the functioning of the CDA (1998) provides a key example of responsiveness. Targets and official ratings e.g. star ratings become the external measures of performance on which people are assumed to be able to make judgements, with transparency the key to trust in this process (Stewart and Wisniewski 2004).

The coalition Government position in 2011 on community safety is underpinned by a model of human behaviour that assumes individuals will balance their own needs with an element of social responsibility, which also reflects a good deal of New Labour’s discourse around encouraging older people into paid work (Powell 2005). In parallel, police organisations behave reflexively to anticipate concerns and changing patterns of need. This benign model is somewhat undermined by evidence that suggests that individuals do not always make rational choices (Rose 1999) and that for some people, particularly vulnerable and dependent groups, choice can be anxiety provoking (Barnes & Prior 1995): a position further compounded by the fact that such groups tend to be disproportionately exposed to risks (Powell and Wahidin, 2009). At the same time theoretical debate has exposed the complexity of the relationship between public services, fragmented across the statutory and third sectors (Clarke and Newman 1997, Rose 1999), and a range of public service consumers whose motivation is somewhere between altruistic and self-seeking (Rose 1999).

Complexity in the relationship between crime control services and consumers is further exposed when the focus shifts from the structural and organisational level to the individual level of personal lives and relationships. A link between trust and coping strategies has been identified by Taylor-Gooby (2000) in the context of financial decision making. Coping is also the central concern of Sheppard’s discussion of the responsiveness of child care agencies and social workers (Powell and Wahidin 2009). Responsiveness to victims of crime is evaluated on the basis of the ability of services/professionals to deliver practical support, quickly and efficiently. At the same time it is noted that an important feature of the level of stress is the importance of people’s self-evaluation of their success in coping.

Regardless of which conceptualization of citizenship we might take, offenders who have left prison have some way to go before it can be claimed that citizenship has been achieved. A level integration into society is an aspiration but they still experience large scale exclusions, especially in relation to finding and retaining work (Sim, 1991). At the same time victims of severe crimes remain largely dependent upon the organisations that provide them with support to and participation in the community.

However, if we take the sentiment expressed in ‘Mental Health Act’ (1983) to be an expression of the discourses circulating through crime policy and link this with the analysis of governmentality, a somewhat different picture is produced. The deployment of discourses of medicalization enable the population to be managed. Although, the management of mentally disordered offenders has shifted from large institutions, either hospitals to management through the community (Rose 1999). The discourse of normalization which underpinned the move from institutions has been transformed into a discourse of citizenship now managed within specialized spaces in the community which remain heavily supervised by professionals (Sim, 1991; Rose 1999). Of course, we are not suggesting that discourse is an actor or agent here as, along with Owen (2009a), we regard discourse as material which can be manipulated by actors.
Citizenship and Trust

Walklate (2007: 107) appears to support the notion that in the United Kingdom, a certain way of ‘thinking about the relationship between the citizen and the state’ lasted until the 1970s. This was a view in which ‘the citizen had social rights and the state had obligations to fulfil those rights provided that the contract between the citizen and the state had been fulfilled’ (ibid). Here, we can identify the key principle of the welfare state in terms of contractual obligations between citizens and state and notions of less eligibility. Arguably, even within the Beveridge ideal, there were exceptions as to who was included as a full social citizen, with the ‘undeserving’, excluded from full social citizenship (Owen, 2009b). As Cook (2006: 33) suggests, from the ‘dangerous classes’ of Victorian Britain to the ‘underclass’ of the late twentieth century/early twenty-first century, ‘the poor have been portrayed as in essence crimogenic’, posing distinct threats to law and order.

At the dawn of Bell’s (1973) so-called post-industrial age, the Labour government of the United Kingdom in the 1970s ‘presided over high rates of inflation that set the economic framework in which changes in public policy were likely to take place’ (Walklate, ibid: 108). By the time of the international recession of the mid-1970s, time was arguably ripe for changes in the political climate, in terms of social policy, and in terms of what was regarded as the ‘appropriate’ relationship between citizen and state. As Walklate (ibid) shows, public expenditure was viewed as being at the centre of the economic difficulties being experienced and the plan for reducing the inflation rate by restoring incentives included ‘removing what Margaret Thatcher referred to as the “nanny state.”’ Arguably, Thatcher’s (1977: 97) belief in self-reliance, property ownership, ‘paying one’s way’, and ‘playing a role within the family’ as being ‘all part of the spiritual ballast which maintains responsible citizenship’ is the embryo of the political ideas that changed the direction of the relationship between the citizen and the state in the United Kingdom throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Walklate, ibid). The civil disturbances of 1981 and the concerns they generated (repeated and reiterated in the early 1990s) ‘marks that continuing preoccupation with the undeserving; those dangerous classes who live in dangerous places’ (ibid). The riots and ‘disturbances’, varied in their ‘causes’, arguably marked the beginning of a decade in which the criminal justice system of England and Wales was severely tested. In simple terms, changes in direction in the relationship between the citizen and the state were ‘primarily about reducing the obligations of the state to provide and increasing the obligations (as opposed to the rights) of the citizen to contribute to society and provide for themselves’ (Walklate, ibid:109). This view appears to be situated within a wider belief in the free reign of market forces and their ability to increase competition, expand consumer choice, and provide a route out of economic problems. As Walklate suggests, in the UK context, for the individual, such expectations were ‘encapsulated by “active citizenship.”’ Put simply, individual citizens ‘no longer fulfilled their obligations to the state through the payment of their taxes or national insurance contributions’ (ibid). In these particular economic circumstances, it is ‘the welfare of the state, as opposed to the welfare of the individual’ which demanded more of them (ibid).

This view of citizenship appears to have taken strong roots in the contemporary political landscape of the United Kingdom, is enshrined in a range of policy initiatives, and is ‘clearly present within the world of the criminal justice system’ of England and Wales (Walklate, ibid). For example, there has been a rapid growth of Neighbourhood Watch schemes in which active ‘good citizens’ become the ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ of the police; in Victim Support as a voluntary organization and ‘the increasing importance of the symbolism of the victim politically’; and in the generation of ‘consumer charters and concerns with consumer satisfaction within policing’ (ibid). Arguably, a feature of all of these recent developments is the likelihood that the poor or ‘socially-excluded’ are most likely to be the objects of this ‘active citizenship’, rather than its subjects because they do not possess the power to pay or make claims count. Some would describe this as ‘a re-articulation of the principle of less eligibility’, whilst ‘others would say that principle never disappeared’ (ibid).

Hutton (1995) has made the observation that there has been a dramatic, overwhelming increase in the gap between the rich and the poor since 1979, leading him to talk of the ‘30-30-40 society’, which emphasizes not only the gap between the ‘well-off’ and secure and those who are not, but also the increasing numbers who are economically vulnerable. The impact of this growing economic vulnerability for an increasing number of people has been felt ‘nowhere less than in the criminal justice system’ (Walklate, ibid: 111). This view is also
supported by Carlen (1988). Put simply, there appears to be a relationship between an increase in the numbers of those deemed ‘the dangerous classes’ and the level of work faced by criminal justice agencies in England and Wales. As Walklate (ibid: 112) observes, ‘While the nature of this relationship has been strongly contested (and denied) politically, it nevertheless points up the interconnection between the distribution of social justice and the likelihood of being subjected to the criminal justice system’. For example, as the prison population grows, so does the preoccupation with security. The relationship also points to another problem; if the people who come before the criminal justice system are increasingly likely to be from the ‘dangerous classes’- the poor, the unemployed, the homeless, the physically ill, and the mentally disturbed- ‘then how might such people be treated justly by it?’ (ibid). The author goes on to pose a further poignant question: ‘What does a socially just punishment for a mentally-disturbed offender look like who becomes homeless following the implementation of policies designed to provide care in the community and what resources do they have as individuals to manage how they are being dealt with?’ (ibid).

The role of professionals is to encourage offenders to move along a continuum towards self-management while they anticipate and manage the risks involved (Rose 1996, 1999). These discourses of citizenship provide a number of reference points e.g. work, not engaging in crime, exercising choices in the community, and obligation to a particular community: but the partial and fragmented way these discourses penetrate both policy and practice means that a number of different, often contradictory positions are established (Watson 2000). The differences between the different models of support, residential care and supported living, are evidence of this uneven process.

The Governmentalisation of Offenders

Despite the fragmented nature of criminal justice policy processes that impinge on differential outcomes for offenders we can consider the different outcomes in relation to the ethic of the self central to governmentality (Rose 1999; Peterson 1997). This ethic, deployed through the discourses of citizenship, works to construct offenders as useful while also identifying those who are greater risk. The latter, experience further segregation and surveillance by professionals with more coercive technologies. As noted earlier this ethic of the self is composed of four dimensions: ethical substance, mode of subjection, self forming activity and telos or end product. It concerns the way bodies are made useful, productive and self-managing. These dimensions will now be considered in relation to choices and opportunities produced for people processed in and through criminal justice machinery.

The first dimension, the **ethical substance**, is that part of the self that is to be worked and subjected to ethical judgement. In this context we can consider the identity formed and the feelings of responsibility and obligation being produced. The identities of citizen-tenant, of worker, as consumer in the marker, as member of the community are suggestive of a new identity for offenders. These identities are formed in opposition to previous identities of dependence. At the same time feelings of responsibility are created as individuals become accountable for their choices and obligation is produced through a ‘felt responsibility’ for a particular community.

The **mode of subjection**, relates to the way in which the individual recognises themselves in accordance with particular rules and norms, and puts these into practice. The recognition of oneself as citizen-tenant, worker, consumer, and member of a community requires the offender to actively engage in these processes and through this engagement to demonstrate their compliance with the rules and norms. There are examples of ex-offenders from prison engaging in work and exercising consumer choice. In relation to community based voluntary work the two themes of work and affiliation to a particular community. Nevertheless, these circumstances remain incomplete and fractured as the relationship with the community and the formation of obligation is mediated, not by the individuals themselves, but through informal control mechanisms that manage the individual in the community.

The third element is the **self forming activity** or ethical work required transform and develop the individual as an ethical subject. This relates to the particular practices individuals engage in to maintain their identity. Discussing governmentality, Rose (1999), while cautioning against any necessary correspondence,
identify a range of techniques where offenders work upon themselves to modify their behaviours, improve their knowledge and develop skills linked to their identity and modes of subjection. Many of these activities relate to reflective and confessional practices. However, in relation to the offenders we might identify practices that sustain individual self-discipline i.e. attendance at work, appearance, maintenance of personal space, and relationships with other prisoners. In the marginalized spaces that offenders occupy these self-forming activities are mediated, encouraged and supported by professionals. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is not an option for offenders not to comply with this discipline without having to face the consequences. The final dimension, telos, relates to the aim governmentality: the production of the useful, productive and ethically self managing individual; the role of services and professionals is to encourage and support offenders towards this goal.

Concluding Observations

Approaching interpersonal relationships through the medium of ‘trust’ and ethical decision-taking is seductive because it appears to offer comprehensive solutions to both structural and personal dilemmas at the point of contact between professionals such as probation officers. Whilst such an approach based on ‘trust’ directly addresses the inequities that arise from explicit decisions, there are implications that it is less able to digest imbalances of power between offenders and institutional and professional groups. We concur with Walklate (2007: 153) when she cogently links ‘trust’ with ‘risk’ as the other side of a ‘two-sided relationship’, and in relation to how the ways in which actors manage daily life is ‘informed by the concepts of risk and trust constitutes the surface manifestation of this deeper structural relationship: the relationship between the citizen and the state’ (ibid: 157). However, whilst we acknowledge that feminist and postmodern perspectives have contributed to the study of ‘both the nature of knowledge and the knowledge construction process’ (Walklate, ibid: 160), we respectfully favour a ‘new’ approach to ‘trust’ based on Owen’s (2009a) Post-Postmodern sensitizing framework. We acknowledge that ‘trust’ is indeed a fertile and comparatively under-researched area of criminological theorising, and we recommend that the following steps are taken in an effort to ‘prepare the ground’ for future theoretical and empirical investigation based on large-scale synthesis.

Following Owen (ibid); we recommend that ‘trust’ is examined in terms of Agency-Structure, and we favour a non-reified conception of agency in which actors or agents are defined as entities that are, in principle, capable of formulating and acting upon decisions. We regard structure as the ‘social conditions’ (Hindess, 1986: 120-1), or the circumstances in which actors operate including the resources they may draw upon. Structure may then refer to discourses, institutions, social practices and individual/social actors in the study of ‘trust’. We recommend employing the concept of Micro-Macro in work on ‘trust’, and here this meta-concept refers to differences in the units of and scale of analysis concerned with the investigation of varying extensions of time-space. In our view, Micro and Macro should be viewed as distinct and autonomous levels of social process. Time-Space as a concept is recommended in the study of ‘trust’, and this meta-concept refers to significant but neglected dimensions of the social. Classical theorists such as Durkheim have tended to regard time as ‘social time’, distinct from a natural essence. However, the question of how differing time-frames, including those associated with the macro-social order and those with the micro-social, interweave is a complex matter that relates to debates pertaining to dualism and duality of structure. We favour Dualism here and would be against any attempt to conflate ‘risk’ with ‘trust’. It is clear from Walklate (2007) that the two terms are closely linked but distinct nevertheless. Whilst we consider much of Foucauldian Post-Structuralism to be essentially anti-foundational, we recommend Owen’s (ibid) use of modified notions of Foucauldian Power in relation to the study of ‘trust’. Here, we recognise the multiple nature of power. Arguably, as Owen (2009: 21) suggests, we can incorporate a synthesis into a meta-theoretical framework for the study of ‘trust’ which combines Foucauldian and other relational concepts of power with an understanding that there is also a systemic dimension to power. An acknowledgement that some agents ‘possess’ more power than others, and that the reason for this may lie in the fact that certain elements of power can be ‘stored’ in the roles of those such as Magistrates and Police Officers, and in networks of social systems is something which Foucauldian Post-Structuralism and Postmodern perspectives tend to ignore. Following Owen (ibid), it is contended that if we are to employ Foucauldian insights pertaining to power in studies of ‘trust’, we must recognise the dialectical relationship between agentic power
and systemic forms of power; the relational, contingent and emergent dimensions of power, and the concept contra Foucault that aspects of power can be ‘stored’ in roles. To reiterate, in relationships built upon ‘trust’ it is often the case that some actors possess more power than others.

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