Abstract

The relationship between justice and freedom has remained inadequately explored in the literature on Durkheim. The existing literature has either discussed Durkheim’s concept of justice in the narrow contexts of the division of labor, relation to human talents, and relation to Durkheim’s Jewish background. In this paper, Durkheim’s concept of justice is reexamined in terms of its relation to his concepts of freedom. It is argued that for Durkheim justice is the condition of possibility of freedom under advanced division of labor. The state plays an instrumental role in this relationship by allocating rights and powers to individuals and by protecting equitable social relations through regulation.

Introduction

Over the years, scholars have persistently focused on Durkheim’s thoughts on the methods of social sciences, the division of labor, religion, suicide and crime. Durkheim’s concept of justice, however, has not attracted much attention. Furthermore, the few that have studied the subject matter have discussed it in the narrow contexts of the division of labor (e.g., Sirianni 1984), its relation to human talents (Green 1989), and its relation to Durkheim’s Jewish background (Schoenfeld and Mestrovic 1989). Moreover, they all have failed to systematically discuss the concept in relation to another concept that is of utmost significance in Durkheim’s thought: freedom. This paper aims to address these shortcomings. It argues that for Durkheim justice is the condition of possibility of freedom under advanced division of labor. The state plays an instrumental role in this relationship by allocating rights and powers to individuals and by protecting equitable social relations through regulation.

Functions of Morality

In its most developed form in the work of Durkheim, morality appears as: (1) regulation expressed in imperative law, which demands complete obedience from individuals (obligatory); and (2) a social ideal to which individuals aspire (the ‘good’)

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Duty is morality insofar as it commands. It is morality conceived as an authority that we must obey because, and only because, it is authority. The good is morality conceived as a desirable thing that attracts our wills to it spontaneously, quickening our desire for it. (1961: 96)

As regulation, morality restrains human forces that if left unto themselves “tend to grow beyond all bounds” (1997b: xxxii). The philosophical basis for this is that, along with all other forms of existence, human activity too is by necessity subject to restraint by other beings (1997a: 252). As regulation, morality is the condition of possibility of social life because it restrains human’s pursuit of selfish interests (egoism). Moral restriction of human activities takes place through rules (legal or customary) which force “the individual to act in accordance with ends that are not for his own, to make concessions, to agree to compromise, to take into account interests superior to his own” (1997b: 172-73). The function of morality, in other words, is to create altruism by making human beings to follow impersonal ends. Altruism, in turn, makes a harmonious community of endeavors for the collective interest possible. Durkheim believes that no human group will be able to persist without moral discipline.

As the ‘good,’ morality is the regulator of humans’ range of desires and wants, which are not by nature predisposed to restraint and “No living being can be happy or even exist unless his needs are sufficiently proportioned to his means” (1997a: 246). In animals this equilibrium is established through instinct because they depend only on material conditions. Animals’ faculty of reflection is not sufficiently developed to imagine any other wants other than the physical ones. This is not, however, the case with human beings because most of their needs are either not dependent on their bodies or not to the same degree: “Beyond the indispensable minimum, which satisfies nature when instinctive, a more awakened reflection suggests better conditions” (1997a: 247). When desires are not controlled they can only be a source of anguish because they are insatiable by definition. The collective consciousness plays this role by assigning an upper limit to which people can legitimately aspire to. This regulation, however, must be recognized as just by individuals otherwise they will not consent to restrict their desires. Therefore, they “must receive it from an authority which they respect, to which they yield spontaneously” (1997a: 249). This authority is society’s stock of fundamental moral values

...society...is above all a composition of ideas...Foremost of these ideas is the moral ideal which is its principal raison d’etre. To love one’s society is to love this ideal, and one loves it so that one would rather see society disappear as a material entity than renounce the idea which it embodies. (1974: 59)

At the center of these values is

...the ideal man as the society conceives him, and each society conceives its ideal in its own image...The ideal type which each society demands that it members realize is the keystone of the whole social system and gives it its unity. (1974: 56-57)

Evolutionary Nature of Morality

Morality evolves based on the law of division of labor. This law applies to “organisms as well as societies” and its origin goes back “into an infinitely distant past...almost contemporaneous with the coming of life upon earth” (1997b: 3). This evolution consists of a gradual separation and specialization of various functions which are originally indistinct. It is a spontaneous,
unconscious movement driven by a “need for distinction and separation” (1983: 95) inherent in reality itself. In human societies, the original state takes the form of mechanical solidarity, i.e., “an absolutely homogenous mass whose parts would not be distinguishable from one another” (1997b: 126). Here a strong, well-defined collective consciousness imposes itself on everyone and punishes non-altruistic acts. The latter are considered threats (crimes) against the unity of the collective and are identified by inhibitive laws. Elements of the collective consciousness are usually crystallized in religious symbols that attract and awe the individual. At this stage, given the primitive nature of life, the range of human desires is limited (mostly to desires for necessities of life). Furthermore, individuals’ actions are reflexive and habitual rather than reflective and self-determined and they themselves possess little or no worth in comparison to the collective.

Demographic changes eventually disturb the original state. These changes, if they bring about closer interaction between people and not dispersal, will result in a Darwinian struggle over scarce resources. This struggle, however, is a functional struggle. This means that in the same location different occupations can coexist without being forced to compete because they pursue different objectives. However, occupations that perform the same functions are forced into competition over limited resources. An increasing division of labor functions to prevent such a situation and “to create between two or more people a feeling of solidarity” (1997b: 17) by forcing various individuals to concentrate only on one part of the total function (specialization). This makes individuals dependent, rather than competing, with each other. Now, they can coexist and cooperate in relative harmony (equilibrium). Harmony here is relative because it arises only of moderation of conflicts and not their complete elimination. This is because it is based only on limiting egoism not eliminating it. For Durkheim, ‘equilibrium’ (order, stability) is a middle course between total conflict and total harmony of interests and reflects conditions of existence. It is, put differently, a state of compromise which is regulated and stabilized through laws and customs and is reached only through a long process of trial and error of trying to adjust to conditions of existence. The end result is ‘organic solidarity.’ However, equilibrium can also be reached through means other than specialization (e.g., immigration, colonization of other places, acceptance of defeat, suicide).

Civil laws increase rapidly in number as the division of labor increases. They function to regulate functional interconnections by restoring the status quo when they are disturbed. Under increasing division of labor beliefs and sentiments that are specific to certain sectors of society (‘professional moralities’) grow in number and result in a decentralization of moral life. These professional sentiments are moral because they “force the individual to act in accordance with ends that are not for his own…to agree to compromise, to take into account interests superior to his own” (1997b: 172-73). Under these conditions the stock of beliefs and sentiments that transcend professional barriers decreases and becomes less commonly known. Civil laws make up for the decreasing share of direct individuals’ knowledge of the collective interests, which tend to become increasingly abstract and remote. Under contemporary levels of division of labor a state of affairs is finally reached where the only sentiment capable of transcending sectoral beliefs and presenting itself as the collective interest is the idea of moral individualism (or idea of ‘humanity’). Moral individualism means having “sympathy for all that is human, a wider pity for all sufferings, for all human miseries, a more ardent desire to combat and alleviate them, a greater thirst for justice” (1975: 64). Moral individualism is now the ultimate object of moral action and, contrary to the nature of moral ideals of characteristic of mechanical solidarities, is not totally unconnected with the individual’s interests.

Durkheim’s evolutionary view of morality results in his moral relativism: a society in its various stages of evolution possesses different, and increasingly multiple, forms of morality, all of which are natural and just. This is why he dismisses all claims to philosophical-ethical absolution as certain historically-specific principles raised to the level of universality (1974: 80-1; 1979: 30-1; 1997b: 5-6). He believes that it is only by adopting a value judgment that one can rank different moralities which, from a factual standpoint, are only a collection of imperatives and
ideas. Durkheim, for his part, believes in the superiority of the contemporary moral individualism over the morality of past societies.

**Why ‘Moral Individualism’ Is Moral?**

Durkheim distinguishes his own conception of individualism from that of eighteenth century liberalism, epitomized by Kant and Rousseau, which “the Declaration of the Rights of Man sought…to translate into formulae, that which is taught in our schools and which has become the basis of our moral catechism” (1975: 61). According to the liberal view, Durkheim argues, acts that are based on personal motives are immoral and those that only have impersonal ends in view moral. The problem with this view, he argues, is that the individuals are held in such a high steam that their interests and rights become irreconcilable with that of the common good. Kant, for example, argues that a rational, abstract faculty (pure, practical reason), which is inherent in all human beings, can point to the common interest. Kant, therefore, Durkheim continues, raises the individual to the level of a sacred being that “has something of that transcendental majesty which the churches of all times have given to their Gods” (1975: 62). Although for Rousseau, according to Durkheim, it is the impersonal ‘general will’ that constitutes the end of moral action, he views, nevertheless, individual “as a sort of absolute who can and must be sufficient unto himself” (1975: 63). He therefore deifies acts of egoism. Both Kant and Rousseau’s brands of ‘individualism’ are, therefore, anti-social in nature because they grant the individual more respect than the collective and let the individual’s interests override that of the collective’s. This is why Kant and Rousseau have difficulties reconciling the two in their works and cannot account for the establishment of society. Durkheim writes that, in general, this was also the reason behind eighteenth-century liberal thought’s obsession with political freedom and free development of individual: it always saw a contradiction between “Liberty and authority” (1956:89). Since the state was the only possible source of authority, it became one of the main focuses of liberal thought. Liberal’s attitude towards it, however, was ambivalent. On the one hand, it was a potential threat to individuals’ liberties; on the other, it was needed to protect these very liberties. A compromise was reached: the state’s authority, which was conceived to be an artificial apparatus, was justifiable only to the extent that it meted out “negative justice,” i.e., protection of individuals’ natural rights (1996:52).

Durkheim argues that the Kant and Rousseau’s mistake is that they do not realize that if the individual is held in such high esteem, it is not because he is inherently respect-worthy or possesses rights, but because the society has bestowed these on him. He writes that individuals must be made knowledgeable of the true source of their dignity (i.e. society) through education and, thereby, made to love it and sacrifice their interests for it. This, however, requires a lengthy process of education from childhood. But since the eighteenth-century view of individual “has penetrated our institutions and our customs,” first a transformation of existing educational system to one that teaches that “It is humanity that is sacred and worthy of respect” is required (1975: 62).

Durkheim also distinguishes his moral individualism from that of Spencer and the classical economists. To him, these are only different forms glorification of individuals’ egoistic, utilitarian aims and a “narrow commercialism which reduces society to nothing more than a vast apparatus of production and exchange” (1975: 60). True individualism, for Durkheim, consists in glorification of the individual’s universal, altruistic interests. He blames the shortcomings of views such as those of Kant, Rousseau and Spencer on their misplaced individualism. By this he means four different forms of explanations: (1) science of individual psychology; (2) explanations in terms of organic factors; (3) explanation in terms of the individual’s intentions or particular circumstances; and (4) explanations in terms of individuals’ mental states or dispositions (Lukes 1982:7). He also refers to (3) and (4) as “abstract” individualism, under which he includes: (a) natural law theory, according to which social order arises out of innate moral rules; (b) the
Hobbesian school, which sees the origin of social life in institutional sanctions; and (c) Manchester economists, who argue for spontaneous engendering of social order (Wallwork 1972:35). Durkheim argues that abstract individualism contains a “double error” (Durkheim 1973:37-9). The first error is that it starts with the flawed assumption of an absolutely autonomous, ahistorical individual as the starting point of theoretical deliberations. This assumption, in turn, has immense consequences for the abstract-individualism’s solution to the “gravest” dilemma of social theory: whether to “subordinate society to individual or the individual to society” (Durkheim 1978:112). The first solution is that it subordinates individual to society—e.g., Hobbes—and, thereby, denies any moral worth to the individual. The second solution is that it subordinates society to individual (e.g., Spencer) and, thereby, denies society any reality of its own. In both cases, however, a methodological mistake is made: the complex (society) is explained by the simple (the individual).

The second solution is Durkheim’s main target. This solution is usually followed by a utilitarian ethics, a laissez-faire economics, and a rigid political individualism (Alpert 1961:138). His main opponent here is utilitarianism and Spencer. He rejects the utilitarian argument that pursuit of self-interest will result in social order. He finds a number of problem with the utilitarian scheme: (1) it assumes that interests are given; (2) it cannot account for the reconciliation various interests of the individual; (3) it cannot account for the problem of rationality, i.e., how the relation between interests and means of achieving them are to be conceived; and (4) it cannot satisfactorily explain the problem of order, i.e., ‘how can social stability emerge out of pursuit of interest?’ (Parsons 1974:xlvi-xlvii). The last one of these is the crucial one. Spencer, in line with the economic branch of utilitarian tradition, introduced individually-chosen contracts as the key to the problem. Durkheim rejects this view. He argues that contractual agreements are made possible only through certain non-contractual elements that provide individuals with “the definitions of the interests for which contracts may be entered into…the means by which such interests may legitimately be pursued…and the bearing on contracts of interests other than those of the contracting parties…” (Parsons 1974:xlvi-xlvii). These non-contractual elements are legal rules that reflect dominant social views of the ‘good society,’ ‘justice,’ or what can in general be called ‘social ends.’ In other words, collective conscience identifies the form that the relationships between individuals have to take. In making this point, however, Durkheim talks his way around a legitimate claim of the methodological individualism: logic and science can deal only with empirical facts (in this case, individuals’ behavior and interests) and not ‘social ends’ which are in reality subjective value judgments about future events (Merton 1990:22). He would not have this because it would have resulted in a conception of society that resembled Hobbes’ ‘anomic’ state of nature (where interest reigns) and would have robbed it of, in the words of Alpert (1961:176), any capacity for “integral activity.”

Durkheim argues that one of the major mistakes of abstract individualism’s is its interpretation of freedom: it mistakenly believes that release from direct forms of social control, characteristic of mechanical solidarities where the collective conscience’s authority denies any freedom to the individual, means absolute release from any form of collective control (absolute freedom) (Parsons, 1960: 146-147). He believes that collective life under organic solidarities does not dispense with the collective control of individuals but only requires new forms of it which are compatible with the individuals’ newly found freedoms. Here, collective control essentially takes the form of collective values and discourses that render the acceptance of such freedoms a responsibility on the part of individuals (Parsons, 1960: 146-147). An example of

2 Durkheim distinguished between five different sets of collective consciences that were to govern individuals’ actions and reconcile their diverse interests under the modern conditions of complex division of labor: “the morale individuelle, the morale domestique, the morale professionnelle, the morale civique, and a fifth set for which he has no title but which governs the relations of men to one another precisely as men” (Steeman 1990:70).
this, provided in *Suicide*, is Protestants’ obligation to the collective beliefs of Protestantism not to obey direct control of any church and, in stark contrast to the Catholic, to preserve their direct relationship to God if they want to remain good Protestants. Nevertheless, as a result of their first error both solutions, and this constitutes the second error of abstract individualism, picture human beings’ as inherently anti-social, egoistic beings that constantly run into an unnatural, forced, or artificial entity called ‘society.’

**Justice**

It was mentioned earlier that, for Durkheim, morality appears as (1) regulation expressed in imperative law, which demands complete obedience of individuals (obligatory); and (2) a social ideal to which individuals aspire (the ‘good’). It was also mentioned that the latter consists of a society’s vision of ideal human being. Now, adjustment of rules to this ideal so to bring them to reflect it, is what constitutes justice of him. This usually takes place automatically under ‘spontaneous’ division of labor. Spontaneous here means when the course of the evolution of the division of labor is not externally controlled as in class and caste societies. Therefore, justice

…is the necessary accompaniment to every kind of solidarity. It is necessarily encountered everywhere men live a life in common, whether this results from the social division of labour or from the attraction of like for like. (1997b: 77)

This is why for Durkheim any society, through the course of its development, contains some form of justice. Where the spontaneous development of the division of labor is hampered, injustice will follow. A major instance of this is the contemporary class- or caste-controlled division of labor (“forced” division of labor). Here rules and laws reflect class and caste interest and not that of the individual as such

…it is not enough for rules to exist, for occasionally it is these very rules that are the cause of evil. This is what happens in the class war. The institution of classes or castes constitutes one organization of the division of labor, one that is closely regulated. Yet it is often a source of dissension. (1997b: 310)

Here is where injustice takes place: “constraint begins only when regulation, no longer corresponding to the true state of affairs and consequently without any moral foundation, is only maintained by force” (1997b:312). Unjust rules are causes of immense suffering. Since people now deeply believe in the promises of moral individualism they are less likely to be content with their lot in life. Conflict and strife, therefore, becomes rampant. In general Durkheim views the rise of various social movements of the nineteenth century as reactions not to the division of labor as such—after all, how can one challenge a law of life?—but the abnormal forms it has taken. He therefore argues in favor of a situation that is in accord with the ideal of ‘humanity’ and, therefore, agreeable to all and no longer based on the ideals of bygone eras (1975: 66; 1997b: 310). The ideal of moral individualism, for him, is the only legitimate source upon which modern rules can be based because it is product of historical evolution itself. Any other criterion would be either utopian, i.e., not a product of historical evolution of society, and, therefore, impractical if not outright dangerous to social order. Adjustment of rules to the ideal of moral individualism results in justice in that in results in injecting “an even greater equity into our social relationships” (1997b:321).

For Durkheim inequity means two things: (1) misallocation of individuals to social roles, and (2) lack of equivalence in the exchange of goods and services. (Lukes 1972: 175). The first one can be remedied by equalizing the external conditions of competition: “If nothing hampers or favours unduly rivals most fitted for each type of activity will succeed in obtaining it” (1997b:
Equality of opportunity, nevertheless, Durkheim concedes, will most likely result in unequal outcomes. These outcomes, however, according to him, will be accepted as just because its ultimate source (i.e., moral individualism) is perceived to be legitimate. The second form of inequality can be prevented by ensuring that contracts are just, i.e., external conditions under which contracts are agreed upon are equalized so that the price of objects or services is equivalent to the labor that they embody. Removal of these two main forms of inequality will result in structurally integrated and normatively legitimate form of social life. But how can we be certain that a state, although it may represent itself as a state of happiness and calm, is really an objective state of equilibrium and not the subjective preferences of the observer? Durkheim introduces crime and suicide rates as the objective yardsticks for recognizing a true state of equilibrium: “The average number of suicide or crimes of every description may serve to indicate the level of immorality in any given society” (1997b: 12).

Durkheim believes that the highest form of justice is charity. Charity is the deepening of feeling of human fraternity: “It ignores and denies any special merit in gifts or mental capacity acquired by heredity. This, then, is the very acme of justice” (1996: 220). Charity for Durkheim is qualitatively different from justice in its more popular form of respect for the individual. Charitable people, though they care about justice for others, do not care about whether justice has been done to them in one respect: “the best amongst men are capable of working without getting an exact recompense for their pains and their services” (1996: 220). However, he believes that such achievement is rare

Durkheim’s passion for justice, however, is exclusive of women. Women are largely absent in his work, and when they do appear briefly, they are “consigned to the exterior of society, to the nonsocial sphere of biological reproduction” (Lehmann 1994:4; also see Lamanna 2002:178). His comments on women are usually derogatory. In Suicide, for example, he writes of women that “Fundamentally traditionalist by nature, they govern their conduct by fixed beliefs and have no great intellectual needs” (Durkheim 1997b:166). When it comes to women he even neglects his own principles of education. Instead of outlining the importance of women’s education for increasing moral authority of society, he takes the opposite line and rejects such measures (Gane 1995:233). Another neglected group of individuals in the work of Durkheim are immigrants. By the close of the century France had about one million or more immigrant workers who were not only the constant target of violent acts of the French workers, but also a convenient excuse for the latter’s mobilization for strikes and demonstrations by various parties (Noiriel 1996:152; Jones 1999:11). However, since in those days immigration was not considered to be a legitimate subject for France’s national memory, a whole segment of France’s
collective history and identity was relegated to the realm of private memories (Noiriel 1996:106). In line with the spirit of his time, Durkheim (1961:280) only in passing suggests a need for an “economic cosmopolitanism” that is to be “less personal in its temper, less exclusive, more receptive to people and things from abroad.” For the rest, the immigrants’ plight is explainable in terms of certain temporary anomalies associated with the division of labor; in time their working condition will be regulated and they themselves will be absorbed in France’s cultural life. In general, this is also Durkheim’s view of various socialist movements which to him, despite socialists’ claims to scientific origins and aims, are only expressions of the “collective malaise” [Italic original] (Durkheim 1958:7). To Durkheim these are no serious obstacles in the way of realization of the meritocratic ideal of the Republic (Pickering and Walford 1998:8).

**Justice and the State**

Durkheim argues in favor of a commitment by Western countries to address the injustices of their societies.

The task of the most advanced societies may therefore be said to be a mission for justice. That in fact they feel the need to tread this path we have already demonstrated, and this is proved also by everyday experience. Just as the ideal of lower societies was to create or maintain a common life as intense as possible, in which the individual was engulfed, ours is to inject an even greater equity into our social relationships... (1997b: 321; also see 1961: 77)

The state can serve the cause of justice by expanding human rights through legislation. Durkheim pits this conception against the natural rights doctrine according to which humans’ rights are inherent in their nature and definable once and for all: “man is man only because he lives in society. Take away from man all that has a social origin and nothing is left but an animal on a par with other animals” (1996: 60). Another way in which the state can serve justice is by protecting individuals from the oppressive influences of various social spheres, particularly the economic sphere. In order to prevent the state itself from becoming one such nefarious sphere, Durkheim suggests that it should be checked by the forces of secondary professional groups (civil society). He is, however, skeptical of the ability of nation-states to rise above their national egoisms and act for the greater good of an international entity that, though prefigured by the very ideal of ‘humanity’, is yet to exist (1961: 76).

**Freedom**

Justice based on moral individualism, characteristic of contemporary society, is different from justice under mechanical solidarity in that the former has the individual as its end

…the characteristic of morality in organized societies, as compared to segmentary societies, is that it possesses something more human, and consequently more rational, about it. It does not cause our activity to depend upon ends that do not directly concern us. It does not make us the servants of some ideal powers completely different in nature from ourselves, powers who follow their own course without heeding the interests of men. It requires us only to be charitable and just towards our fellow-men, to fulfill our task well, to work towards a state where everyone is called to fulfill the function he performs best and will received a just reward for his efforts. (1997a:338)

In order to understand this difference we have to understand Durkheim’s concepts of nature and freedom.
“Man depends,” Durkheim writes, “upon...three kinds of environment: the organism,³ the external world and society” (1997b: 287-88; also see 1995: 431). The totality of these environments constitutes nature.

By natural order we understand only what might occur in what has been termed the state of nature, that is, under the sole influence of physical and organico-physical causes. (Durkheim 1997b: 322; also see 1975: 78)

Nature operates according to natural laws that are subject to the law of causality. Natural laws refer to the necessary relations between phenomena which can be expressed in scientific propositions (1974: 80). Natural phenomena operate in total disregard of human will and control. As such, they tend to dominate humans and, therefore, constitute a realm of bondage for them. Understanding the natural order renders it amenable to human control and regulation. This means stripping nature of its “fortuitous, absurd and amoral character” (Durkheim 1997b: 321). Freedom, therefore, begins with the knowledge of, and intervention in, the natural order. Such knowledge is gained only through science: a rational system of clear and distinct ideas about phenomena. Liberation from natural bonds, therefore, is realized only through science of natural laws; there is no other means of liberation (Durkheim 1961: 116; 1974: 35; 1996: 91; 1997b: xxiii).

According to Durkheim, the natural law of social relations is inequality: human beings are unequal in the external conditions of their existence and in their individual abilities (1979: 2; 1997b: 321). Natural inequalities, which “are the very negation of liberty” (1997b: 321), can be greatly reduced through social regulation. This means subordination of these naturally-given inequalities to socially-produced equalities, “an utter reversal of the natural order” (Durkheim 1997b: 321). This reversal results in a moral order. The more complete this control is, the greater become the chances of reducing inequalities of opportunities in the struggle for existence and, therefore, the greater the degree of social justice. Modern form of justice and freedom, therefore, depends on scientific knowledge. Durkheim argues, furthermore, that modern individuals prefer freedom to bondage to nature because they are capable of “value judgments” (“moral ideal,” “moral judgments”). Value judgments refer to

…all judgments, be they individual or collective, which men pass with respect to their own actions or the actions of others, so as to single them out by ascribing a special value to them, which is regarded as quite separate and distinct from all other human values...moral judgments occupy a special place within the totality of human judgments… (Durkheim 1974: 79)

Freedom, therefore, is nothing but individuals’ act of imputing to certain state of affairs a worth and desirability which they lack in their factual existences. The desire and freedom to intervene in the social order are needed if the social order is to be made more equitable (Durkheim 1956: 90; 1958: 52; 1961: 54; 1997b: 320, 321). This equity, in turn, results in individual autonomy in the concrete sense of having the opportunity to consciously choose one’s goals in life.

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³ The organic constitution of human beings, i.e., the body and its bio-chemical reactions, the psychological make-up, tendencies, drives and instincts. (for more details see Durkheim 1997b: 283-87).
References


