Cultures and People of the Post 9-11 Port Securityscape

Yarin Eski[1]

Abstract

In criminological debates, explanations of post 9/11 fear and control warn for the rise of security obsessions in which civil rights and social welfare principles are endangered. In this study on port security, the author entered the social world behind port security, where antiterrorist maritime laws that are influenced by global xenophobic politics and populist media, push police officers, customs officers and security personnel to interact in a multi-agency in the space of the port to establish a secure environment. The key research question focuses on this multi-agency of port security. By giving face to the rather unknown port security community and it cultures, this paper provides a criminological understanding of those responsible for securing and policing "at the docks". As will be argued, illustrated by of collected ethnographic data, the port security realm reveals how virtues of fearlessness, trust and wish to decontrol come paradoxically forward from cultures of fear and control.

Introduction

For centuries, people with different nationalities, backgrounds and intentions come and interact at ports. Captains, shippers, tradesmen, migrants, slaves, even pirates, all moored to do their business in the port and to interact with local communities. An interaction most clearly established by visits to local brothels (Kane 2005). The decadent urban port life flourished in particular during times of war and insecurity (McCreery 2000). However, this salty, historical image of the port changed rigorously over the last two centuries. The growing global demand of products and transportation has resulted in the construction of larger vessels to transport more cargo, faster. In effect, ports had to adjust to vessel sizes and capacities. Modern rapid technological advancement of 'containerization, roll-on-roll-off ("ro-ro") loading, computerized tracking, multi-modal connections', as well as and international market liberalisation, leading to 'miles of warehousing and free trade zones' (Kane 2005: 3), changed ports into dehumanized hubs, indispensable in the global trade. A port is therefore ambiguous, where on the one hand, it is characterised by a cosmopolitan attitude because of its global importance. Yet on the other hand, it can be considered as a hidden landscape, kept away from the public eye (Van Hooydonk 2007).

The issue of port security started to gain attention, when in 1948 the United Nations inserted the *International Maritime Organisation* (IMO). The IMO is responsible for an evolution of legislation and security measures, which closed the port realm further and further. In this realm, a multi-agency of public authorities and private security firms together are appointed to establish port security (Metaparti 2010). This contribution shall focus on that multi-agency of port security. Resembling Jeremy Bentham, who was inspired by the regulation of port workers to create his panopticon (Linebaugh 2003), criminologists can be

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[1] Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research - University of Glasgow, y.eski.1@research.gla.ac.uk

inspired by port security to grasp the essentially contested concept of 'security' and its paradoxes (Der Derian 1995). For criminology and criminal justice research, the (port) security question needs to be answered, as critical criminological theorization of late modern security societies in general has received, quite surprisingly, little criminological and sociological attention (Zedner 2007). Moreover, the once separated fields of criminology, policing studies and security studies are now interacting more and more (Hoogenboom 2009), meaning that port security and policing ought to deserve criminological scrutiny. The analysis of everyday work-life of the multi-agency engaged in constructing security in the transnational spaces of the port will shed light in this article on how globalized insecurities are constructed and navigated by a multitude of security agents at national seaport borders. By examining the multifaceted relations between policing, control and management of risks and threats making up and made by port security actors, the possibility rises to break through security's paradoxes and (unintended) harmful effects. This understanding has relevance for many more (trans)national settings, such as train-stations, airports, embassies and consulates, within a broader range of research fields that focus on crime and (in)security.

The key research question in this study on port security, in order to obtain the understanding, is as follows: *In which way is security constructed by and does it construct the socio-legal and cultural group identities and praxes of the public authorities and private security in the port?* Critically leaving from frameworks on cultures of fear and control, the ethnographic exploration started in several European port areas, in search of a criminological 'verstehen' (Ferrell, 1997), to answer the key research question. As a result of this search, this paper shall argue how *global fear and control obsessions, that made this study's participants' employment possible to begin with, are met with fearlessness and bring forward virtues of trust and a will to decontrol*. To support this argument, firstly, the security status quo in the port security domain is contextualized, followed by a description of the ethnographic approach to port security. Several social-cultural specifics of ports and security shall be described, as well as how access into the port securityscape was negotiated, and which methodology was used for data collection. After that, provisional results from thematic analyses are disccused, followed by a conclusion.

Context

Fear and Control

Today's global social realm has been ascribed features of instability. Our daily lives are constantly ready (and prone) to be changed, resulting into continuous feelings of distrust, which soaks the everyday in ontological fear and insecurity, leaving behind a growing obsession to control (Bauman 2000; Furedi, 2005; Garland 2001). 9/11 can be considered to be the momentum of that increased fear and control obsession targeted at 'risky others' (Hudson 2009). Not necessarily criminal(ized) acts by people are considered dangerous, but 'people [are] seen as… potentially threatening to our security' (Furedi 2005: 115). However, it has become complicated to define the self versus the other, the normal versus the criminal. Consequently, it is 'ever more difficult to specify the self that is to be made secure', over and above that it is unclear 'against whom or what is anyone to be made secure' (Lipschutz 1995: 4). Uncertainty about what or who to control or secure leaves us in the dark about what we are actually producing security for (Bauman 2006).

Nevertheless, the societal devotion to security effectuates a far-going securitization, a trend during which all sorts of new challenges and dangers for societies as individuals, are (re)conceptualised in populist security-related terms (Fidler 2007; Neocleous 2007; Zedner 2009). Security in post 9/11 cultures of fear and control therefore has become an uncertain concept in itself. Unclear security definitions and understandings leaves behind the question, who is actually responsible (Zedner 2006). Every time new legislation is advanced over former laws, of which is claimed they do not work to give citizens (a sense of) security, governments paradoxically admit they cannot control insecurities at all (Ramsay 2009). The

take-over of the State by the growing global security market comes therefore as no surprise (Johnston and Shearing 2003). The commodification and celebration of draconian security strategies and measures continues. There appears to be a preparedness to justify any means necessary in the war on terror, whereas those means seem to threaten society more than the war on terror itself (Schuilenburg and Van Calster 2011). The violation of basic civil liberties through security governance, throughout the world, has become the status quo (Simon 2007; Koemans 2009; Van Swaaningen 2009). Such governing *through* security has also entered the port realm.

Governing (through) Port Security

Ports are placed high on the international community's agenda, when the IMO laid down the 9/11-inspired *International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code* (2003). Two other events influenced the design of the ISPS code, namely the attack on the French tanker "Limburg", nearby Yemen in 2002 and the attack on the "USS Cole". Purposed to harmonise and standardise port security on global, regional and national level, the ISPS code rearranged the domain of ship and port security (George and Whatford 2007). The Code was adopted in 2002 and to be compliant with the Code, national ports, besides ships and oil platforms being the other ISPS Code consignees, had to live up to ISPS security demands on 1 July 2004. From that point onwards, all agreeing ports had to be ISPS-compliant (IMO 2003). Compliancy consists of implementations of the Code's security provisions, given in the obligatory part A, as well as in the non-obligatory part B. Several activities and authorities are identified in the Code in order to improve port security standards, of which key elements are mentioned here:

- Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) and a Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA), as described in art. 2.1, section 5 and art. 15 of the Code, overall, guarantee continuous development and upgrading of security, by identifying (threats to) critical infrastructures, prioritising security measures and the identification of weaknesses. Given the differences in security threats and risks per port, PFSP's and PFSA's differ from port to port (Wenning et al., 2007).

- The Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) (art. 2.1, section 8) develops, implements, revises and maintains the PFSP. The PFSO also has to take care of cooperation with the Ship Security Officers (SSO) and Company Security Officers (CSO). (S)he controls one or more port facilities (art. 17) and carries out frequent security inspections. Moreover, a PFSO can modify PFSP's 'to correct deficiencies and to update the plan to take into account of relevant changes to the port facility' (ISPS Code 2003: 20). Other tasks consist of providing adequate personnel training, communication with authorities about security threats and appointing security services.

- A PFSO is appointed by the Contracting Government (CG). A CG can delegate much of its tasks to security contractors, except for determining the applicable security level 1 ('normal'), 2 ('heightened') or 3 ('exceptional') (ISPS Code 2003: 33). A CG approves PFSA's and PFSP's, carries out port state control tasks and designs the Declaration of Security (DoS).

- A DoS documents the assessment of potential threat ships can pose to the port area; it addresses security requirements shared between a port and a ship. It states as well each other's responsibility (art. 5.5).

The ISPS Code brought about numerous security initiatives and activities undertaken by private and public authorities who interact in a multi-agency, overseen by state control. Unclear is whether the ISPS code security requirements are actually combating the increasing body of maritime terrorist associated dangers and fears, e.g. modern piracy; drugs, weapons and human trafficking; environmental pollution; theft and plunder; and corruption (Kostakos and Antonopoulos 2010; McNicholas 2008; Zaitch 2002). It is argued that the 9/11 rhetoric turned out to be convenient to push member states in their implement of ISPS security measures. However, thorough assessments and examination of actual insecurities and adequate responses were not constructed (Metaparti 2010). While ISPS compliant ports elevate security claims increasingly, the issue of conceptual and pragmatic uncertainty remains (Fidler 2007: 258); it is unsure whether security really increases or not (Nordstrom 2007).

The ISPS Code did effectuate restricted access to ports via 'fences, gates, camera surveillance and access control systems' and resulted into the obligation for any incoming person, including own company and security personnel, to 'to justify their presence at identity checkpoints' (Van Hooydonk 2007: 11). Ports have therefore become now physically and legally sealed off areas, disconnected from surrounding urban areas, keeping out local communities. Due to the global liberalisation of labour markets, port workers come and go (Kane 2005). It leaves behind ad hoc worker relations that heavily affect social control and the sense of responsibility for a safe and secured port environment.

Members of the port security multi-agency, in specific police officers, customs officers, and private security guards have to deal with such unclear security policies and praxes. Being confronted with physical, conceptual and ontological insecurity on a daily basis, they simultaneously improve and are targeted by security initiatives, most clearly exemplified by security guards who undergo privacy penetrating family background checks (Van Oenen 2009). A port can therefore be considered to be a place where public and private authorities have major yet sometimes unclear and even conflicting responsibilities in securing and policing the port environment (XXXX November 2011). Their realities are formed in dehumanized spaces where less social interaction is taking place than ever before in ports' social history. *Decreasing* social life in the port has therefore become connected with *increasing* security measures and fear of insecurity. In these settings, the study's participants carry out their port policing and security tasks. They build their cultures, praxes and attitudes that are constantly (re)negotiated (Kunda 2006). These dimensions of port security and policing shall be explored in the remainder of this paper, yet before doing so, several aspects of entering the port security realm as ethnographic site shall be discussed.

Methodology and Difficulties

Criminological verstehen through ethnographic fieldwork

To a certain extent, critical (criminological) ethnographers have been reluctant to understand security agents (Albro et al. 2012). Hence, the author's aim is to see what police officers, private security guards and customs officers in the port experience, and what they assume, either in conflict or in line with this research's theoretical framework. Their experiences and opinions are important to discover in which way they themselves value port security, to obtain, instead of the etic-perspective (one's own morally formed perspective), an emic-perspective (Druckman 2005). By staying close to the community's members, data was collected, observed and understood in interaction with the participants (Blee 2009). This is crucial, as security questions are integrated in the daily lives of ordinary people working in extraordinary environments (Goldstein 2010). Doing so, such questions and their complex entanglement with the participants' lives are not overlooked. Meanings that are given to everyday security praxes and cultures were explored. It was therefore crucial to discover and

be aware of not just the phenomena that make up port security, as much as 'the phenomena of [port security] being-understood as such' (Wender 2004: 59).

Fieldwork in the European port areas of Glasgow, Grangemouth, Hamburg and Rotterdam took place from March 2011 to June 2012. In total 72 hours of interviewing and 86 hours of (participant) observation hours were recorded with 73 participants (in)directly involved in the multi-agency of port security[2]. It allowed for the capture of narrative accounts of participants about the socio-legal and cultural dimension behind port security. For interviews I mostly went to participants when they were working at a terminal or when they were on patrol duty. The hidden community of port security is being entered at that point, seeing security related tasks happening. Interviews therefore lead to participant observations sometimes as well, which allowed the author to move beyond narrated accounts and made it possible to collected data about work practices and social interactions (Adler and Adler 1987). This increased the emic-perspective. In fact, by "doing" port security, the author got accepted as an insider and gained trust of participants, which is crucial in specifically crime and criminal justice ethnographies (Ferrell et al. 2008). From this position, stories and experiences in the port security social world were being recorded. This position of being accepted by the participants required dissociation outside the port securityscape; the author's presence was therefore subject to constant self-reflection (Elias 1956).

Access

As claimed before, the port is a legally and socio-culturally closed realm. Nonetheless, the author managed to get in, although in the beginning it was difficult to arrange cooperation and negotiate access. On many occasions requests had to be made if it is possible to discuss with gatekeepers if and how operational staff could be interviewed about their work experiences in port security. Although in most cases cooperation was promised, sometimes much effort was put into merely arranging interviews without having the certainty an interview would actually take place. For example, the author went to a well-known, global security contractor. There, the company's specialist on maritime security was explained which research intentions the author had, which was to critically analyse port policing and security praxes. This was frowned upon, and the specialist stressed to not make any assumptions too quickly. The author replied and argued that these "assumptions" are research hypotheses and thus part of doing research. Getting assistance from the specialist representing the entire security contractor was impossible from that point onwards. After the meeting he promised to email back, which he did:

> *Dear Mister XXXXX, dear XXXXX,*
>
> *With some delay, I want to inform you by these impersonal means that we will not cooperate in the research. Reasons for this are that we, and rightly so, have no influence on the results. Although we are convinced of our capabilities, there is always the possibility that negative publicity will rise (unfortunately based on experiences with earlier research) by the vision of the researcher. A second reason is that at this moment there is no priority to currently put time and energy at our disposal into external research.*
>
> *Of course, I wish you a lot of luck in the finishing of your promotion.*
>
> *Best regards*

Many more of such disappointing replies followed – from public authorities as well. Yet, it became normal at a certain point, and indicates how closed and secretive ports (intentionally)

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[2] Results used for this paper as based on eight in-depth interviews and five participant observations with 13 participants who perform in the port security multi-agency (5 port police officers, 2 customs officers, 3 private security guards, 1 company security officer, 1 ship agency specialist, and 1 ex-antiterrorist unit employee).

remain. Still, the more participants the author interviewed and he joined during their activities, the broader the participant network became, as is common for the 'snowball technique' (Zaitch 2002).

Limits

As many other ethnographies of crime and criminal justice, practical and ethical limits were involved (Belousov et al. 2007; Ferrell, 1997; Zaitch 2002). During mobile surveillances the author participated in, he drove along with private security guards at night to terminals that occasionally endure metal theft. Moreover, inhaling chemical gasses, not being noticed by a 15m high container carrier, a container that falls from the top of a container stack because of stormy weather; all of them are typical, everyday port insecurities and safety problems, which are likely to happen and happened. Still, the focus was and remained to be on the everyday in the port security social world, as shall become clear in the following paragraph in which findings shall be discussed.

The Everyday

Desisting Boredom, Desensitising Terrorism

Effects of 9/11 and the ISPS Code have been felt by this study's participants. Most of them claimed it has been the starting point of heightened security. Nonetheless, having done the research, eleven years after 9/11, and seven years of the Code's first entry in force, none of the participants told they actually were confronted with terrorist attacks or "a terrorist". In fact, most of them considered the presence of terrorism on their port turfs as ridiculous

> The risk of a little fire is bigger than terrorism… ISPS [created] more security-awareness, but not for preventing terrorism (Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) at an oil refinery).

They were worried about other more direct practical and site-specific dangers, such as falling containers, aggressive truck drivers and leaking petrochemical gasses.

The biggest danger, or issue, turned out to be the daily routinization and boredom during work. They start mostly very early in the morning, which means getting up before 6AM, survive the day filled with repetition and go back home. In particular private security guards, who do shifts in 24/7 guarding occupation, would like to see some action for excitement or for simply having a day off. They rather seem to be fighting in a "war on boredom" instead of on terror, as is more often observed in port 9/11 security work (Konopinski 2009). An extreme example of killing time was when a private security guard explained he watches DVD's when he guards his client's terminal, like during one of the participant observations. The participant and the author watched 'Meet the Spartans' briefly, which is a parody on the movie '300'. '300' tells the story of 300 Spartan guards that defended Sparta until the very last man died. 'Meet the Spartans' ridicules the hyper masculinity and city-state pride of the old Greek legion of guards that is depicted in '300'. Watching a parody that ridicules guarding and defending, during the participant's shift of guarding his own port security turf, is itself a parody; it reveals the participant's appreciation of (the seriousness of) his line of work. For some, the boredom and simplicity of their work affected their self-worth:

> Well, let's be honest ey… security guard is also just, well, that's what I always say, a simple window and door shutter […] yeah, that's what it comes down to, because closing is what you do. Closing a little window, closing a little door, and enable the alarm. Well, excuse me, but anyone can do that (Private security guard).

The war on terror seems to be the least of these two security guards' issues. Actually, many participants thought 9/11 and other terrorist attacks belong to New York City, London or Barcelona, but not to "their port". In the perception of the variety of actors involved in port control and security, the actual experience of terrorism or terrorist related activities is null. They consider 9/11-like events in a port as too unrealistic. Thus, the first observation in support of this paper's main thesis is as following: the European port security realms in this study, that are initially shaped by the ISPS Code, a Code that comes forward from global post 9/11 (cultures of) fear and control, cultivate and are cultivated by a multi-agency that itself displays a high level of down-to-earthiness and fearlessness. Given this observation made in the port security realm, the author started to wonder what the participants think about (the logic of) the war on terror via the ISPS code, as shall be explored in the next section.

Trust (through) the Code

> Elizabeth Swann: "Parley. I invoke the right of parley. According to the Code of the Brethren [Pirata Codex – YE], set down by the pirates Morgan and Bartholomew, you have to take me to your captain".
>
> Pirate Pintel: "I know the Code".
>
> Excerpted from *Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of The Black Pearl* (2003).

In the excerpt, after being captured by pirates, characters Elizabeth Swann (Keira Knightley) and Pintel (Lee Arenberg) respect the Pirate's code. Indeed, Swann is taken to the captain by Pintel, without causing her any harm, as is guaranteed for the one who invokes the right of parley. Living by the code, depicted in this small interaction between two parties in conflict, may it performed in a Hollywood production, is not that far from how, for my participants, the ISPS Code has become a code to live by.

The ISPS code was declared to be the beginning of a new era of tightening the port realms. A PFSO and working for a shipping agency, explained how, according to him, after the attacks of 9/11, getting off- and on-board was sharpened; it became very, if not, too strict. Also Aaron, a former security guard at a fruit terminal, explained to me he thought 'that [ISPS] has started it faster… yes, [security] got a bit quicker off the ground'. Participants in the Port of Rotterdam declared how especially their port was eager to implement the ISPS code as fast and thorough as possible. This eagerness was sometimes sarcastically referred to by them as behaviour of the blue eyed boy, in matters of ISPS compliance. Rotterdam is naïve to think it is the best secured port, was their main message.

Explaining and ridiculing the way ports became occupied with their own ISPS-compliance, some participants did want to portray their port, and more specifically their terminal, to the author as 100% secure and fully in line with the ISPS code. They seem to glorify the ISPS code era:

> I think it is better [since ISPS]. Well, it wasn't secure, because I was a young boy in XXXX and I used to fish in the port, you know? We had free access, but now I think with ISPS, and rightly so, it should be secure, you can't have everybody going in and out (Port police officer).

Basil expresses here his strong belief in security, and like other participants, he accepts the ISPS reality. Hence, the Code's goal 'to perceive and manage security threats through integrating local/domestic threat-levels into a global awareness-level' (Bichou 2004: 328), is embodied in my participants. Believing in security is described as 'securitism' (Fidler 2007), without doubting it. Several other participants declared as well how the Code can be a useful guide to use, once (new) issues arise. ISPS legislation therefore can be considered to have the status of a religious text to live by in maritime realms, that lets its "followers" conceptualise

port events in security-related terms. The participants' securitism is therefore closely linked to characteristics of securitization (Lipschutz 1995; Zedner 2009).

Besides establishing a firm trust *in* the Code, trust and cooperation *through* the Code is created as well, amongst members of the multi-agency, like a customs officer told me:

> [we] are indeed interwoven with the ISPS, we also have to live up to the ISPS code, and the Port of X, the Port of X authority do have to live up ISPS, matter of speech… basically, everything is solved within the customs itself, we are though, we also have to register, ISPS and that sort of conditions we have to live up to too, of course.

And trust was also established through interaction between the port security multi-agency and ship personnel due to on-board security checks:

> And we had to bring a DoS aboard… a Declaration of Security. Drawn up especially, the captain has to, has to sign for that, and we gave then as well a special phone with it, so 24 hour per day for the security, that with calamities, that we were called about that (Private security guard).

Ship personnel is expected to be ready and cooperative; trust in the port is part of their everyday worklife and smoothens transport operations. The author experienced such trust by himself on multiple occasions. A customs officer, suggested to the author to the teamleader of a customs diversteam during an onboard visit of a vessel that was about to be inspected underneath for drugs. The author received a fluorescent customs vest. At that point he was still on-board of the customs boat, in ISPS waters. The teamleader, on the quayside, shouted to 'Nice sailing?'. 'Lovely sailing', the author replied. He thanked the other customs officer for the coffee and started to climb from the customs boat up to the quayside, onto the ISPS landside area of a large cargo terminal. There, he had to put my safety helmet on my head, as is obliged in any container terminal. The teamleader called me:

> We are about to go on board, have a little safetytalk with the oldy [captain of the ship]… Are you coming? You are going to, in a bit, act as a customs officer. If they ask you something, don't react, otherwise we'll get that bullshit. Delay, you know? I just identify myself on board and that's all they get. I'll register us in the book, you just accompany me, no issue.

Although not allowed, the teamleader found the author trustworthy enough to take him along. Here trust was not established by port security rule compliancy but rule breaking. Subsequently, he and the author boarded the vessel to establish a safe underwater situation for a diving inspection. Inside the vessel the port security multi-agency came alive; custom officers of other departments, police officers and security guards of the terminal where the ship was moored, were all present. It was going to be busy for the captain of the ship, he explained. No need to worry though, because mostly customs get priority and receive good cooperation, he continued. As soon as the teamleader and the author got to the gangway of the ship, a ship crew member who has to control the gangway, a Malaysian man, was standing there for registering ship visitors. Everything went smoothly, including getting the author on-board. 'Customs, we would like to speak to the captain', he said. 'Yes', the Malaysian crew member responded, while smiling. The teamleader said 'Two times', referring to the passes he and the author needed in order to walk around on the ship. Once inside, everybody was kindly greeted, including two Dutch police officers. They greeted back in the same friendly manner, as if there were no issues at hand at all, although the ship was selected after risk analysis. A risky ship sort of speak that ought to be distrusted (cf. Hudson's 'risky other', 2008). Nevertheless, the how social interaction and cooperation between everyone depicted a rather safe environment, where one should not fear anything or anyone. 'You don't got an elevator?', the teamleader joked on the stairs with another crew member. There was laughter. At a certain point a larger cabin with a small kitchen was reached, where the teamleader greeted the captain: 'Hello captain, customs'. The captain, a Russian, had to smile out of

despair when seeing "us customs" coming in, to which the teamleader responded with some gloating: 'More more more more more customs!', he said. We sat down. Next to us sat a man, a ship company agent, with a loud voice, talking in poor English with a strong accent with another crew member. He was there to solve some sort of issue, from what I could understand. The teamleader directed himself in the meanwhile to the captain:

> Okay captain, we're from the customs diving team and we're going to do a diving inspection under the ship. So for the safety of the divers there are some points that have to be arranged before we can start... Maybe you already have some paperwork for me? The Ports of Call [last 10 visited ports], Ship particulars [details of a ship] and the crewlist.

What happened during this short instruction? A non-British customs officer explained in English a Russian captain of an originally German ship that is flagged under the British Union Jack (and thus legally bound to first and foremost the UK), what to command his crew of mixed, mostly Asian nationalities to create a safe underwater environment for the customs divers. At that point, for the customs diversteam, there are the risks of miscommunication due to multiple language barriers, leading in the worst case to continuing container handling operations, while a diving inspection has begun. For the captain the risk consists of having to stay longer ashore, when drugs are found and thus an insecure situation needs to be resolved. At that time, he was additionally under pressure by the ship company to not interrupt cargo handling operations, as the ship company's agent was there. Under this pressure, the captain still needs to let the security check prevail cargo handling operations, which costs time, and time is money. Without cooperation, a diving inspection underneath the ship is impossible, and without inspection, continuation of cargo transportation is impossible. Basically, in this situation it can be seen, how the lines between port operations, safety, security, communication and cooperation are overlapping. Again, as in line with the main argument of this paper, namely how cultivated virtues come forward from vicious cultures of fear and control; in their everyday worklife, people in the port security realm establish swift, mutual trust during security operations, after which the involved parties probably will not see each other again. Therefore, to a certain extent, in the port security working sphere, that is principally shaped by cultures of fear and control, as an effect, next to fearlessness, there is trust established *in* the ISPS Code and there is trust established *through* the ISPS Code, as well as through security operations more generally. Having constructed fearlessness and trust as characteristics of the port security realm, a realm that is initially shaped by fear and control obsession, the following section shall pass on to this paper's final argument.

Bureaucratization and Frustration

One of the ISPS Code's effects participants complained about was the expansion of office work. Getting to the ship, installing themselves, the underwater inspection and leaving the ship, altogether took over six hours for the customs diversteam. Most of it consisted of getting on-board and off-board to arrange the documented safety of the divers, in order to proceed the inspection, which itself merely took half an hour. For them, if anything, a culture of control (Garland 2001) is filling out forms and following the right protocols, instead of actual controlling and securing. After the underwater inspection, there was a debriefing, where the activities were discussed in a routinely, formal language and more forms were filled out. Not necessarily checking the ship, but the fact the numb work was done, made Lucas happy, as expressed in his dying wish to finally be able go to the McDonalds that night, which happened.

     Like the customs divers, also security guards and police officers were annoyed by the Code's bureaucratizing effects. Port Facility Security Assessments, Port Facility Security Plans and other regulations to improve secure access and exits, along with tighter control of security personnel by local governmental authorities, are considered to be more of a burden than actual port security advancement. On one occasion, documents needed to be considered and forms had to be filled out by an inspector of the port police, during an on-board

environmental control check. He wanted to see the ship's certificates to determine the ship's compliancy, next to (inter)national environmental laws, with ISPS Code requirements. Although the captain was getting nervous, judging from his shouting to his first and second engineer, there was no reason for him to be so, as all the right documents were there. Still, ship personnel sometimes fear they cannot immediately find the right documents, and its this fear of being non-compliant that sets off such nervosity. The inspector pities these effects of the ISPS Code as of other international regulations; they have passed their actual purpose, which is to establish a safe and secure environment. Instead, frustration and nervosity has replaced a natural way of interaction.

It is not just ship personnel that is victimised by the increased bureaucracy. The members of the port security multi-agency themselves also find it aggrevating. Security guards are subjected to intensive monitoring by port authorities that have the responsibility to keep an eye on security standards. The author was explained he registers incidents to merely show there *are* incidents, as it would create suspicion at port authorities if no reports of incidents are made:

> [Y]ou should be able to get files from the lockers and listings of what has been there, what happened, ships and that kind of stuff. And if I cannot do that or don't know an answer, a report is being made, after that it all gets fed back to the PFSO, who kicks to my superior and he comes again saying "they have been here, they controlled" (Private security guard).

Bureaucracy, filing and registering in systems to communicate is thus experienced as avoiding (future) conflict on board as well as retaining (future) cooperation, both by the monitoring as the monitored. The control through bureaucratic means has for some made their port security work less meaningful:

> Everything has to be registered, everything has to be monitored, everything nowadays has to be legally justified, sealed off. The job changed so much, it's actually more... Before we had [departmental] agencies, then it was of course a lot of outside visits, on little ships, it was also more human […] (PFSO/shipping line agent).

Paperwork makes up the larger part of their work now, compared with before ISPS. It demotivates them, and it harms the port's traditional social control in ports.

Conclusion

This paper began to contextualise the 21st century port security reality as being a result from cultures of fear and control. Ports turned into locally disconnected yet transnationally connected fortresses, making it hard for outsiders, such as criminological researchers, to enter. Once inside though, and observing the multi-agency of port security, paradoxical effects of the nourishment of the port realms by fear and control. Firstly, this study's participants have not been directly confronted with terrorist related activities and they consider a terrorist attack in their port as unrealistic, and this reflects instead of a cultivated fear, rather a cultivated fearlessness. Secondly, the ISPS code as all-encompassing antiterrorism tool is understood by them, however, but they do not feel to be part of an international army in the war on terror. They rather seem to fight in a daily war on boredom. For them the Code rather meant changes in on-board and off-board interactions. Daily work consists of encounters where trust and cooperation are key ingredients to operate swiftly. If anything, their biggest concerns are their own safety during security activities and to not interrupt transport. Finally, increased post 9/11 control through ISPS, meant for my participants, increased bureaucracy. Hence, the fearlessness towards terrorism; the building up of trust in the fear-saturated spaces of the port; and the frustration about the increased post 9/11 control through ISPS and longing back to more human times, uncovers a culture of

fearlessness in which there seems to be no obsession to control but wish to decontrol. Of course, this study finds its limits in the fact it is based on interviews with port security personnel in European ports, more specifically in North Sea European Ports. A similar study elsewhere in European, Asian, African or American ports might produce very different results. Therefore, in order to locate and understand the inherent paradoxical, virtuous effects of cultures of distrust, fear and control, further ethnographic criminological scrutiny of port security is necessary in other parts of the world as well.

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